Linguists agree on one thing -that language is diabolically hard to study. They do not always agree, however, on the how's, the why's, and the what for's: how one should go about studying it and how speakers manage to do what they do; why it is so hard and why exactly we bother to study it; what language is for, and what linguistics is for. A mainstream view that has been popular in the last thirty years (but not necessarily before that) offers the following answers.
communication. The reason seems to be that the cultural, contextual, and cognitive substrate on which the language forms operate is sufficiently uniform across interlocutors to allow for a reasonable degree of consistency in the unfolding of the prompted meaning constructions. How this works remains in many ways mysterious. What is clear is that language is radically different from an information carrying and information preserving system, such as a code or telecommunications. Language forms carry very little information per se, but can latch on to rich preexistent networks in the subjects' brains and trigger massive sequential and parallel activations. Those activated networks are of course themselves in the appropriate state by virtue of general organization due to cognition and culture, and local organization due to physical and mental context. Crucially, we have no awareness of this amazing chain of cognitive events that takes place as we talk and listen, except for the external manifestation of language (sounds, words, sentences) and the internal manifestation of meaning: with lightning speed, we experience meaning. This is very similar to perception, which is also instantaneous and immediate with no awareness of the extraordinarily complex intervening neural events.
What we are conscious of determines our folk-theories of what is going on. In the case of perception, the folk theory, an extremely useful one for us as living organisms, is that everything we perceive is indeed directly the very essence of the object perceived, out there in the world and independent of us. The effect is contained entirely in the cause. In 6 interaction between a psychiatrist and a subject operating the program, but the rich meaning that seemed to emanate from the machine was in fact read in (constructed) by the subject.
And strikingly, just like a perceptual illusion, this effect cannot easily be suspended by rational denial. In the case of Eliza, the illusion may be hard to block, but it is easy to see.
The more general illusion that meaning is in the language forms is both hard to repress and hard to acknowledge. And for that reason, it has made its way into many scientific accounts of language. In such accounts, the notion that forms have meaning is unproblematic, and the "only" problem becomes to give a formal characterization of such meanings associated with forms. Clearly, if the presupposition that there are such meanings is in error, the very foundations of such accounts are in jeopardy. It has been, I
believe, a major contribution of cognitive linguistics to dispel this very strong unquestioned assumption.
OPERATIONAL UNIFORMITY
It is commonly thought that very different operations apply to the various levels of linguistic analysis. For example, syntax governs the sentence, and semantics provides it compositionally with a meaning. At a higher level, other quite different operations apply to produce implicatures, derived meaning, indirect speech acts. Then rhetorical and figurative devices may kick in, such as metaphor and metonymy.
Our findings suggest a very different picture. Backstage cognition operates in many ways uniformly at all levels. Figure-ground and viewpoint organization pervades the sentence (Talmy (1978) , Langacker (19987/1991) ), the Tense system (Cutrer (1994) ), Narrative structure (Sanders and Redeker (1996) ), in signed and spoken languages, and of course many aspects of non-linguistic cognition. Metaphor builds up meaning all the way from the most basic levels to the most sophisticated and creative ones (Lakoff and Turner (1989) , Grady (1997) ). And the same goes for metonymic pragmatic functions (Nunberg (1978) ) and mental space connections (Sweetser and Fauconnier (1996) , Van Hoek (1996) , Liddell (1996) , which are governed by the same general Access principle. Frames, schemas and prototypes account for word level and sentence level syntactic/semantic properties in cognitive and construction grammar (Lakoff (1987) , Fillmore (1985) , Goldberg (1997) , Langacker (1987/91) ), and of course they guide thought and action more generally (Bateson (19972) , Goffman (1974) ). Conceptual blending and analogy play a key role in syntax and morphology (Mandelblit (1997) ), in word and sentence level semantics (Sweetser (this volume) ), and at higher levels of reasoning and rhetoric (Robert (1998) , Coulson (1997 ), Turner (1996 ). Similarly, we find force dynamics and fictive motion (Talmy (1985 (Talmy ( , 1998 operating at all levels (single words, entire systems, like the modals, and general framing).
This operational uniformity is unexpected, remarkable, and counter-intuitive. It has taken cognitive linguists a lot of hard work and theoretical conceptual rethinking to uncover this series of powerful generalizations. There are quite a few interesting reasons for the difficulty of thinking in this new way. One is that language does not come with its backstage cognition neatly displayed 'on its sleeve'. Everything that counts is deeply hidden from our consciousness, and masked by the 'folk theory' effects mentioned earlier.
Another difficulty has to do with the long tradition of apprehending limited aspects of language in a self-contained, language-specific, descriptive apparatus. The resulting specialized technical vocabulary has been immensely helpful in launching a coherent linguistic science, but regrettably it has also shielded linguistics from a more comprehensive cognitive framework in which the right questions could be asked.
COGNITIVE GENERALIZATION
Operational uniformity, as outlined in the previous section, pertains essentially to language and reasoning. The uniformity is across linguistic levels, the word, the sentence, the sentence and its context, the whole discourse, and ultimately general reasoning. And yet, there are broader and even more interesting generalizations, those that transcend 8 specific cognitive domains. Cognitive linguists have been especially attentive to this dimension of the new research, and they have argued persuasively for the cognitive generality of the mappings, correspondences, bindings, integration, perspectival organization, windows of attention, pragmatic functions, framing, force dynamics, prototype structures, and dynamic simulations that underlie the construction of meaning as reflected by language use. As a result, linguistics is no longer a self-contained account of the internal properties of languages; it is in its own right a powerful means of revealing and explaining general aspects of human cognition.
II. THE CASE OF CONCEPTUAL INTEGRATION
Any science is deeply dependent on the methods at its disposal and finds its essence in the types of generalizations that it seeks to attain. For this reason, changes of methods and shifts in the notion of what constitutes a generalization have a major impact on the evolution of scientific inquiry. The transitions from alchemy to chemistry, from classical thermodynamics to particle kinetics, from Euclid's geometry to Descartes', display the full force of such changes when we look back at them with hindsight. Some of this may be true today, mutatis mutandis, in the shifts of emphasis that cognitive science has triggered with respect to the role and study of language within the scientific field of cognition in general.
In the present paper, I will use the work some of us have been doing on conceptual blending to illustrate the more general epistemological issues evoked above. Some familiarity with conceptual blending in general is assumed. The reader may consult Turner (1996, 1998) , Coulson (1997) for general presentations of the framework.
GENERAL FEATURES AND ORIGINS OF OUR CONCEPTUAL BLENDING THEORY
Blending is a widely applicable cognitive operation. It matches two input spaces through a partial cross-space mapping and projects selectively from both inputs into a third space, the blend, which gets elaborated dynamically. The cross-space mapping exploits shared schematic structure in the inputs or develops additional shared schematic structure.
This common structure is contained and elaborated in a fourth space, the generic space.
The four spaces (inputs, generic, and blend) are connected through the projective links and constitute a 'conceptual integration network' (henceforth CIN for short). A typical example is Seana Coulson's 'trashcan basketball', a game that students in a dormitory might invent, consisting of throwing crumpled paper balls into a trashcan, and scoring points as in basketball. The inputs would be respectively the game of basketball itself and the dorm situation. The mapping would link the basket to the trashcan, the players to the students, the ball to the crumpled paper, with additional links developed for zones, out of bounds, etc. The initial generic space consists of an object being thrown into a container by someone. In the blend, the new game gets elaborated along with the physical constraints on this game specific to the dorm situation. This elaboration yields the emergent structure of the blended space.
We know at present that blending operates as part of many cognitive phenomena in action, design, science, language, art, etc. We also know that it can operate very quickly on-line in everyday thought and action, or very slowly over centuries as in scientific evolution and conceptual change generally, that it can be novel or entrenched to various degrees, highly noticeable or cognitively invisible, purely mental or materially and physically anchored. None of this was immediately apparent. Blending was first noticed in isolated phenomena where it seemed exceptional and even exotic. These conceptual phenomena were manifested through language, but non-linguistic cases were quick to follow. We found that number theory in mathematics had gone through many successive blends, typically involving inputs of space and inputs of number. And Jeff Lansing pointed out to us other fascinating cases in physics (Fourier and Maxwell's work) where scientific evolution and conceptual change had been achieved through the construction of elaborate CIN's. Dan Gruen made us aware that computer interfaces, such as the Macintosh desktop, were also cases of the same cognitive construction process, and we went on to find many other cases in action and design generally. Back to language, we were now able to see Langacker's entrenched integration processes in grammar and Goldberg's fusion of grammatical constructions as yet other manifestations of the same uniformly characterizable cognitive operation. Later work would provide many more generalizations in diverse areas such as morphology and 1 1 1 syntax (Mandelblit (1997) ), literature (Oakley (1995) , Freeman (1997 ), music (Zbikowski (1997 , humor (Coulson (1997) .
The point of briefly recapitulating this development of the research on conceptual integration networks is to get back to the issue of method and generalizations. In the landscape of autonomous mainstream linguistics evoked at the beginning of this paper, there is virtually no way to generalize cognitive operations in the manner just outlined and there is no method that would lead to this type of generalization. It is worth discussing a little more why this is so. There are several aspects that conspire to make it so.
LIMITATIONS OF CONVENTIONAL LINGUISTICS
First, within the study of language itself in conventional linguistics, components are sharply divided in such a way that the descriptive and theoretical primitives of each component are so different that they are generally incommensurable. This makes it impossible not just to find the appropriate generalizations, but even to ask the type of questions that might lead to such generalizations. So for example, in studying CIN's we find a continuum of networks that share fundamental properties and differ along certain gradients (single-framing networks, frame networks, one-sided networks, two sided networks, ...). On this continuum we find Fregean logical forms, counterfactuals, analogies, metaphors of various sorts, and many intermediate cases that fall in between these prototypical cases. I return below to some of the distinctions along this continuum.
The problem, if one grants that this is a powerful generalization, is that it is meaningless in the standard vocabulary of conventional linguistics and so-called formal semantics, in which logical forms, metaphors, and analogical counterfactuals are not even comparable at any level, theoretical or descriptive, let alone cognitive.
Second, the methods of conventional linguistics weigh heavily against the possibility of discovering regularities of the kind exemplified by CIN's. Grammaticality or acceptability judgments are not the appropriate observational data. Truth-conditional 1 2 2 inferences or Gricean implicatures are not either. The point here is that a certain way to conceive the problem space of linguistics, or of semantics in philosophy, has determined methods and observational categories in such a way that central questions (of the form suggested by CIN's and many other constructs of cognitive semantics) cannot even be posed. As I see it, this is not only a great obstacle to scientific progress; it is also socially among the researchers in the field a source of deep misunderstandings. To the extent that the observational categories are accepted and commonly used uncritically, the new questions are not just peripheral, less important, and so on, for conventional linguistics.
Rather, they make no sense at all. This is a serious concern, since generation after generation of linguists is trained according to such methods and observational distinctions.
It is not a matter of different frameworks or different theories. It is, more seriously, a matter of apprehending the world of the data and the data in the world in ways that are so different that they may end up being incommensurable.
Within conventional linguistics and philosophy of language, then, we find a pretheoretical division of components and phenomena, and accepted methods for gathering data which stand in the way of making important connections and generalizations. But as regrettable as those two aspects may be, there is a third which is possibly even worse. This third aspect is the separation of matters pertaining to form and meaning in language from everything else outside of language. In the case of CIN's, the pertinent generalization is not just the one that lets us see a continuum from Fregean propositions to frames to counterfactuals and to metaphors. It is the broader generalization that links this continuum itself to a vast array of conceptual, cultural, physically and socially embodied cognitive phenomena, for example the ones cited above -evolution of the concept of number in mathematics, design of computer interfaces, emergence of new activities such as games or other cultural practices, blending with material anchors, and many more.
The generalization does not consist in a reduction. All these phenomena are acknowledged to be very different from each other and to constitute rich and diverse instances of human 1 3 3 experience. The generalization consists in being able to identify a common cognitive operation that plays a part in all of these cases. The unity and uniformity of such processes remains hidden as long as incommensurable frameworks, methods and terminologies remain attached to different areas of action and cognition.
GENERALIZATIONS AND LIMITING CASES
Let me now go into a little more detail, using aspects of conceptual integration theory to illustrate the broader epistemological points. Science proceeds by means of a dialectical succession of differentiations and unifications. In the case of language and thought, it is undeniably useful to identify and distinguish fixed and novel meanings, predicate-argument structure, figurative vs. more literal expressions, conditionals of various sorts, and so on. At the same time, when fine distinctions are made along many dimensions, a contrary force invites us to look for unity behind the diversity.
Take a straightforward example from geometry. An hyperbola, an ellipse, a parabola, a circle are all clearly different shapes. At an intuitive level, they fall into different categories. Mathematically, they can be given different precise geometric characterizations, specific to each kind of curve. Even more different intuitively from such curves are the straight line, or a fortiori the geometric point. And yet, all these geometric shapes can be viewed as variations on a single theme -the two-dimensional planar section of a three-dimensional (quadric) cone. Keep the plane perpendicular to the axis of the cone, and you get all circles, tilt the plane to obtain ellipses, tilt a little more for parabolas, and tilt again for hyperbolas. Move the plane parallel to one of the sides of the cone until the parabola condenses into a straight line. Move the plane towards the vertex of the cone, until ellipses or circles shrink into a single point. All of these shapes are conic sections, and in spite of the sharp differences they display, fit on the same conceptual continuum.
On this continuum, we find prototypes -the oval of an ellipse, the parabola of the cannonball shooting through the air, the circle of a beer coaster, the asymptotic hyperbola. And we find limiting cases -the straight line, the point, the circle itself relative to ellipses, or the parabola as a limiting case of ellipses stretched out to infinity.
A theory of conic sections offers a way to see a useful mathematical unity behind the obvious diversity of shapes and figures, without reducing this diversity to a single prototype (we do not say that because these shapes, when viewed from this perspective, belong to the same continuum on which the circle is a prototype, they are therefore all more or less prototypical circles). CIN's offer a similar way to see unity behind the obvious diversity of particular manifestations of meaning constructions. We start, as in the conic section case, by formulating the general characterization evoked above (cross-space mapping, projection into a blend, emergent structure by completion and elaboration, etc.).
Then we look at specific variants of this general structured dynamic process.
Coulson's trashcan basketball, in spite of its simplicity, represents a fairly general kind of CIN. It is called a two-sided network, because there is frame projection from both inputs (basketball and throwing paper into baskets). There is emergent structure in the blend through mental elaboration and physical confrontation with the affordances of the real world in which the blend is run. Notice that the basketball blend does not fall into one of the particular more specific forms which I shall show are prototypes along the continuum of blending. It is not understood as a metaphor. It is not counterfactual; the new game really takes place. It is not a Fregean composition of basketball and paper-throwing. It is not an analogy between two preexisting domains (basketball and waste disposal) -the point of the blend is not to point out some analogy between those two domains, and exploit one (basketball) to make inferences about the other (paper disposal). We call a CIN with such properties (frame projected from one input, and content projected from the other input) a Single-framing Integration Network. Needless to say, if this were the only form of integration ever observed, there would be scant justification for 1 6 6 setting up a theory of conceptual blending. Simple framing (or its Fregean equivalent) would suffice.
Still, in spite of the glaring simplicity of single-framing frameworks, it is worth looking just a little at the embryonic blending that they do contain, because it will turn out to have consequences for our continuum. First, there is some non purely compositional structure in the blend after all, since a new role has been created that was in neither input, the role father of Sally. Reference to this new role is possible after it has been created:
Paul is the father of Sally. As such , he is legally responsible for this auto accident.
Second, some structural information in Input 2 was used in setting up the cross-space mapping and then projected to the blended space: that Sally is a girl or woman's name,
while Paul is a boy or man's name. Since father is specified in the kinship frame as 'man', it matches Paul and not Sally. In the blend, we have the information that Paul is a man, and also the additional structure that Sally is a daughter, not a son. This is provided less trivially than it seems by automatic alternations in the kinship frames of Input 1 (female ego-father / daughter-ego). As a result, another role, daughter of Paul, is set up implicitly in the blend. Now we can take another look at the Generic space. When a kinship frame is mapped onto two people, the generic is more than just any two elements. It has attribute structure; fathers and daughters are people; Paul and Sally are people. So the generic space in our example is the simple structure of 'two people'. This is a slightly abstract notion, since the kinship roles are people in an abstract sense. As the CIN gets elaborated dynamically, the Generic space itself gets elaborated. The two people are additionally a man and a woman/girl. The fact that all spaces, including the generic, get elaborated dynamically in the construction of a network is an important general property of CIN's. So after elaboration, the Single-framing CIN in our kinship example looks something like the configuration of Fig. 3 .
FIG. 3
Recall that this kind of example would not by itself constitute strong evidence for blending. The point is different. If CIN's generally are part of our meaning construction capacity, then Single-framing CIN's are available as one particular type of CIN, and they account for the kind of meaning construction usually subsumed under framing or Fregean propositions. In other words, we don't need CIN's for one kind of phenomena, and
Fregean propositions or framing for another. This is of course like saying that we don't need a theoretical framework for circles distinct from the framework used to study ellipses and hyperbolas. That in turn does not mean that we can't study the special properties of circles (as opposed to other conic sections). By the same token, we may want to study the special properties of Single-framing networks (as opposed to other CIN's), because such networks are common and constitute a prototype on the continuum of CIN's. In fact, looking back in this light on the Fregean (and Tarskian) approach to meaning, we can say that typical semantic theories took what we're calling here Single-framing CIN's to be the defining prototype for all of core meaning construction, and dismissed other phenomena such as metaphor or analogy as belonging to entirely different areas like rhetoric or general reasoning.
The above argument for understanding framing as a prototypical (and limiting) case on a continuum of CIN's is based on theoretical economy and generality of cognitive operations. But we can offer additional empirical evidence in its favor. If we are indeed dealing with a continuum, then we should find CIN's that are close to Single-framing, but that let in slightly different projections or emergent structure, not available purely compositionally. Consider first mythological variants of fatherhood such as:
Zeus is the father of Athena. She was born out of his head, fully clad in armor.
This example points to the fact that there was more pattern completion and projection from inputs in the Paul and Sally case than we had realized. We would have inferred naturally from that case the existence of a mother, biological birth, baby, and so on. All these The kinds of blends we have been talking about can be constructed using language.
The evidence we have invoked is semantic. Can we find syntactic evidence for the generalizations defended here? One kind of evidence would be very strong: if the phenomena considered here are indeed instances of the same kind of meaning construction 2 2 2 (through CIN's), then this might be reflected syntactically by the use of a single syntactic form to prompt their construction. In fact, English, almost too good to be true in this regard, has a construction which is specialized in exactly this way. The construction is the apparently harmless but actually immensely powerful construction "NP x is NP y of NP z ".
Turner ( 
FIG. 6
In this Single-framing CIN, the relevant generic relation common to the two inputs is indeed "part-whole": y is a part of w, and x is a part of z. So we see that because we 2 4 4 have more general vs. more specific frames, one effect of Single-framing can be to set up a part-whole relationship. The same is true for "door of the car". door identifies quite generally something that opens into a container. That general frame of a container with a 'door' is projected onto the more specific frame of 'car', and the XYZ mapping scheme plus construction of the Single-framing CIN identifies a part of a car with specific properties of the 'container with an opening' frame.
So the picture that emerges is something like the following. "x is the y of z" is a syntactic construction that prompts the conceptual construction of a CIN with the general properties outlined above -x and z in one input, mapped to y and w in another input, and integration into a blend from those two inputs. The kind of CIN will depend on the kinds of inputs we build based on the linguistic characterizations of x, y, z, and background and contextual information. Words like father, top, door, will evoke certain frames easily, and may prompt Single-framing (a simple default strategy that yields what we perceive to be a more literal meaning). But discrepancy between the two inputs (as in father of cruelty) will lead to more elaborate CIN's and subjective feelings of increased non-literality and metaphoricity along the continuum.
Notice that when an entrenched metaphor is the appropriate conventional way to frame an input, as for example with TIME AS SPACE (Christmas is not far) the corresponding CIN will constitute the default, and there will be no feeling at all of metaphoricity. For example with our XYZ construction, expressions like the end of the week, the middle of the month construct a CIN based on the cross-space mapping of space (middle of an object, end of an object or path) onto time. Because this cross-space mapping is the conventional metaphor TIME AS SPACE, it is directly available and the expression is 'felt' to be literal. Subjective feelings of metaphoricity or non-literality have more to do with distance from entrenched defaults and basic mappings, than with whether metaphor is actually involved or not. Another way to say this is that conventional blends based on basic and general metaphors are not felt subjectively to be different from many kinds of conventional single framing, although they are technically in different positions on our continuum of CIN's. Cognitive effort and specificity of domains interact in this respect with the continuum. This can be taken as an additional argument for the fundamental unity of the processes at work.
The fact that syntactic constructions may characterize CIN's in this way allows us to look at issues of composition and compositionality in a more revealing way. There has often been a tension in linguistic theories between the formal compositionality of syntactic forms and the none-compositionality of the corresponding meanings. But we can now see syntactic forms as prompting mapping schemes rather than conveying static truth conditions. And those mapping schemes (as opposed to static truth conditions) can be composed in a way that follows the overt syntactic composition.
In Fauconnier and Turner (in preparation), we show in some detail how this works for the "x is the y of z" construction discussed above. We show that the successive blends systematically triggered by sentences like:
Elizabeth is the roommate of the daughter of Paul.
Prayer is the echo of the darkness of the soul.
are exactly the same, in spite of the fact that the first composes two Single-framing networks (and is therefore equivalent to an ordinary Fregean composition), while the second composes two highly metaphorical CIN's and is not truth-compositional.
I will not give the technical derivation here, but the idea is fairly simple. "Elizabeth is the roommate of z " sets up a CIN linking an initial space with people to a frame of housing (input space APARTMENT). A blend is created in which Elizabeth has the role roommate with respect to a second element z, constructed by a second 'of' construction which links z to another space containing the kinship frame ego-daughter. "the daughter of Paul " links z to daughter and Paul to ego, and blends again, giving the configuration of In Fig. 7 , we have a composite frame, and the links in the CIN allow us to access the appropriate inputs -the two people Paul and Elizabeth in one space, the role roommate in another, and the role daughter in a third. As a result of this successive blending, a third person has now been added to the 'people' input. The space element for that person is entirely characterized by its position in the blend and links to the spaces containing frames.
The meaning in this case is created by successive Single-framing CIN's. In Fig. 8 , the ultimate mapping configuration is the same, but the cross-space mappings are metaphorical.
The blend is intuively more complex, because it contains elements which belong simultaneously to the domain of sound and to the domain of light. The understander presumably expands more cognitive effort because the overall integration is none-standard and because the CIN's are highly two-sided.
It is also interesting to see in these examples that the composition of the mapping schemes can follow the linear order of the English sentence:Elizabeth to roommate starts the cross-space mapping; of signals the integration and the blended space; daughter moves us to a kinship space with a second projection; of signals the second integration; Paul provides the last missing element for this integration, from the initial input space. The same would be true in the composite metaphorical blend: the metaphor of prayer as an echo starts the process, and sets up a space of sound. darkness links the first blend to a new space of light, and soul provides the last missing element to complete the second integration and the multiple metaphor.
The mapping schemes could also be composed in the reverse order, 'daughter of Paul' first, and then 'roommate of'. The resulting configuration (Fig. 7) does not reflect any ordering. This seems desirable since we might be processing the sentence from scratch and be introducing the frames in the order in which they appear linguistically, or we might have already set up the integration 'daughter of Paul' before building the composite blend.
Fregean composition does not apply for the metaphorical case, and for the singleframing one, it would have to follow the reverse order, building the compositional meaning bottom up, right to left.
Our view of compositionality, only sketched out here, would generalize a fundamental process of meaning construction over the entire continuum of CIN's. It would retain the insights of truth-conditional composition for strict single-framing networks, while accounting for the many cases which are not compositional in the sense of truthconditional semantics.
CONCLUSION
I have attempted in this paper to discuss some general methodological issues pertaining to the study of language in the framework of modern cognitive science, and to illustrate some of the points with examples from current work on conceptual integration.
One emphasis from this perspective is that explaining linguistic distributions is not an end in itself. Rather, it is one of the many facets of an overall understanding of cognition and language. A second point ( economy) is that language forms carry very little information per se, but derive their power by activating preexistent networks in a way that creates emergent structure. A third point is the operational uniformity of much backstage cognition, hidden from consciousness, counterintuitive, and masked by our folk-theories.
From uniformity follows cognitive generalization . Linguistics becomes more than a self- 
The Buddhist monk
Riddle of the Buddhist monk and the mountain: A Buddhist monk begins at dawn one day walking up a mountain, reaches the top at sunset, mediates at the top for several days until one dawn when he begins to walk back to the foot of the mountain, which he reaches at sunset. Making no assumptions about his starting or stopping or about his pace during the trips, prove that there is a place on the path which he occupies at the same hour of the day on the two separate journeys.
The boat race [ excerpt from a sailing magazine ]
As we went to press, Rich Wilson and Bill Biewenga were barely maintaining a 4.5 day lead over the ghost of the clipper Northern Light, whose record run from San Francisco to Boston they're trying to beat. In 1853, the clipper made the passage in 76 days, 8 hours. -"Great America II," Latitude 38, volume 190, April 1993, page 100.
(They are analyzed in Turner (1996, 1998 
